The Affordable Care Act (ACA) will dramatically alter health insurance markets and the sources through which individuals obtain coverage. As the ACA is implemented, it is essential to monitor the intended and the unintended consequences of these regulations. To evaluate the changes in health insurance markets linked to the ACA, it is critical to consistently measure the size and structure of health insurance markets, as well as the performance of participating health insurers, prior to and post-ACA. In this paper we discuss challenges of describing the size, structure, and performance of the individual and small group markets. Next, we discuss improvements in data availability starting in 2010 to address some of these concerns. Finally, using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), we evaluate insurance market structure and performance during 2010-2012, focusing on enrollment, the number of participating insurers, premiums, claims spending, MLR, and administrative expenses.
Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) will dramatically alter health insurance markets and the sources through which individuals obtain coverage. All low-income Americans above the poverty line who lack access to affordable employer-sponsored insurance will be eligible for subsidies to purchase individual insurance in state-based Exchanges (or "Marketplaces") . This provision of the ACA will greatly expand the size and importance of the individual market. The Congressional Budget Office projects that approximately 17% of the non-elderly population will obtain coverage in the individual market by 2016 (Congressional Budget Office, 2012) ; today that number stands at only 5%.
Only 35.2% of private-sector establishments with fewer than 50 employees offered health insurance to their employees in 2012. In contrast, 95.9% of those with 50 or more employees did so. 1 Establishment of Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) exchanges in 2014 will simplify the health insurance shopping experience for small employers (50 or fewer full-time equivalent employees) as 1 http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2012/tia1a.htm (accessed September 23, 2013) 2 well as allow their employees to choose from among options in an 'exchange like' setting, although without access to exchange tax credits. 2 The ACA also increases regulation of health insurers and health insurance markets, for example, by controlling premium increases through rate review regulation and by regulating insurers' medical loss ratios (MLRs), which broadly represents the proportion of health insurance premium revenues that is paid out in medical claims. Additional ACA provisions require policies to include essential benefits and limit price variance through modified community rating.
The MLR regulations were among the first ACA provisions to be implemented. Beginning in January 2011, insurers in the individual and small group markets must spend at least 80 percent of their premium revenue on medical care and quality improvement activities while insurers in the large group market must have MLRs of at least 85 percent. Insurers must provide annual information on their MLRs to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Those that fail to meet the 80% and 85% minimum MLR thresholds for the individual/small group and large group segments must provide equivalent rebates to their policyholders beginning in 2012.
While the MLR regulation monitors the ratio of spending on medical benefits to premiums, another ACA provision, rate review regulation, complements it by controlling premium increases. Under rate review regulation, insurers must document and publicly justify "unreasonable premium increases" when they file advance notice of rates starting with the 2011 plan year. Before the ACA, states had substantial variation in their authority to review rates (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010) . Almost half of the states had "prior approval" rate regulation in which regulators could review the rates 3 and approve or disapprove proposed changes. In contrast, other states had "file and use" regulations in which insurers had to provide actuarial justification for rate increases, but could proceed with rate increases without state approval. However, the state reserved the right to intervene if the rates were later found to be "unreasonable." Only a few states lacked any regulatory authority over rates. States also had different criteria for deeming rates to be reasonable. 4 States differed in levels of enforcement of their regulations as well as in the strength of their regulatory oversight. While the ACA does not require any changes to the states' existing rate review regulation authority, various states have amended their laws to align them better with the federal law.
As the ACA is implemented, it is essential to monitor the intended and the unintended consequences of these regulations. To evaluate the changes in health insurance markets linked to the ACA, it is critical to consistently measure the size and structure of health insurance markets, as well as the performance of participating health insurers, prior to and post-ACA.
In this paper we discuss challenges of describing the size, structure, and performance of the individual and small group markets. Next, we discuss improvements in data availability starting in 2010
to address some of these concerns. Finally, using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), we evaluate insurance market structure and performance during 2010-2012, focusing on enrollment, the number of participating insurers, premiums, claims spending, MLR, and administrative expenses.
II. The Size of the Individual and Small Group Markets for Health Insurance

Individual Market
Estimates based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) suggest that approximately 5% of the U.S. population has individually-purchased coverage (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011, http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/). However, estimates vary widely across different federal surveys. Abraham, Karaca-Mandic and Boudreaux (2013) the American Community Survey (ACS). They also considered an administrative data source from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). found that federal survey estimates of the individual market vary widelyfrom 9.5 million non-elderly in MEPS to 25 million in the ACS (Table1). Their study suggests three important measurement issues outlined in Table 1 . First, surveys differ in how they elicit coverage in the individual market. Rather than asking respondents directly if they are covered by individual health insurance, they ask about "directly purchased" coverage with different purchasing arrangements (e.g.
from an insurance company or a group such as a school).Second, surveys vary in differentiating the types of individual policies (e.g. comprehensive coverage, limited benefit, disease-specific, or short-term). In fact, none of the surveys ask whether the health plan includes comprehensive medical and hospital coverage. Even if the surveys asked such questions, individuals may not be aware of the comprehensiveness of their plans unless they are frequent health care users. This is important, because some ACA regulations, such as the MLR regulation and the expansion of the individual market under Exchanges, apply only to comprehensive coverage.
5 highlighted a third point: surveys differ in the reference period of the insurance questions (e.g. coverage at the interview date versus coverage any time during the previous calendar year). While "point-in-time" surveys that ask about coverage at the interview date avoid recall bias, they miss individuals who held coverage during the year but dropped it prior to the interview date.
For example, the CPS asks if a respondent had individual coverage at any time during the previous calendar year. This framing has the greatest potential for recall bias (Klerman et al. 2009 ). Moreover, it is not possible to know whether a respondent held individual coverage at the time of the interview, part of the year, or throughout the entire year. These are important measurement issues, especially because enrollment patterns in the individual market are typically dynamic throughout the year. Many who buy individual policies use it to bridge short-term coverage gaps (e.g. transitions from job-to-job or school-tojob and retirement-to-Medicare eligibility).
To partially reconcile large differences across the surveys, Cantor et al. (2007) and Mach and O'Hara (2011) defined a coverage hierarchy, whereby individuals who report multiple coverage types are assigned to only one category. The hierarchy prioritizes coverage types in the following order: public, employer-sponsored coverage, direct purchase, and uninsured. Their basic premise is that a substantial portion of people who report both individual market and another coverage types on these surveys really have one comprehensive policy. For example, an individual could be covered primarily through an employer-sponsored policy, but also have a single-service dental plan and thus report both employer sponsored insurance and the direct purchase option. This adjustment (also presented in Table 1 ) to redefine coverage types into just one main type by using a hierarchy results in a smaller estimate of the size of individual market and a tighter alignment across different federal surveys (8, 215, 358 in MEPS and 16, 635, 033 in ACS) .
Small Group Market
In contrast to the individual market, not all household surveys discussed above can measure coverage obtained through the small employer group market because most household surveys do not ask working individuals about the size of their employer. Several studies have used the size of the worker's establishment in conjunction with whether the establishment has more than one location as a proxy for firm size (Abraham, DeLeire and Royalty, 2009; Monheit and Schone, 2004) . However, this approach would classify a large-firm employee working in an establishment with few employees as a small-firm employee. Even if the survey asks respondents for firm size, it is unclear whether workers can accurately 6 assess this, especially when the firm has multiple locations. Nationally representative employer surveys such as the MEPS-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC), in contrast, can estimate the size of the small group market more accurately than household surveys.
The MEPS-IC samples public and private-sector establishments, collecting information on their health insurance offerings and characteristics of the workers and workplace. A firm could have one or more establishments, but each surveyed establishment provides information on the total number of employees across all establishments, which allows an inference of firm size; firm size is also checked against administrative sources. National and state-level estimates of insurance coverage by year are publicly available from the MEPS-IC.
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Using several statistics reported in these tables, we estimated the number of employees with health insurance in firms with fewer than 50 employees ( Table 2 ). In 2009, approximately 10,587,185 small-firm employees had employer-sponsored health insurance (9,359,072 through fully-insured plans and 1,228,113 through self-insured plans). These numbers do not include dependents of the primary insurance holders. Previous research estimated an average of one dependent per employee in small firms (KaracaMandic, Abraham, and Phelps, 2011) , which suggests a total of 21,174,370 enrollees in the small group market and 18,718,144 in fully-insured plans. Estimates of small group insurance also come from Kaiser HRET/surveys, although their sample size of small employers is typically limited and the micro-data are not easily accessed by researchers.
Thus, prior estimates of the size of the individual market have relied on household surveys and provide a range of sizes due to the inherently difficult nature of discerning individual level coverage. In contrast, estimates of the small group market come from employer surveys linked to administrative data and are more reliable. The challenges in estimating the size of these markets spill over to difficulties in defining the target populations of ACA insurance market policies. Having discussed these challenges, we 7 turn our attention to measures of the structure of these markets, including the number of participating insurers, market shares, and concentration.
III. The Structure of the Individual and Small Group Markets for Health Insurance
Assessing the structure of the individual and small group markets has been hampered by lack of data on these insurers. 
Insurance Market Structure Prior to 2010
Although it is not possible to distinguish small and large group insurers prior to 2010, the NAIC State Pages can be used to study individual market insurers (subject to the caveat that the State Pages do not include data on life insurers that also sold health insurance). Using these data, Abraham and Karaca- credible health insurer serving the individual market. Because "life insurers" do not file data with the NAIC, additional work is necessary to confirm that this really indicates these states had monopoly-like markets. In additional analysis of these 11 states using data from the state commissioners' web pages as well as the NAIC data from SHCE in 2010 and 2011, they confirmed that the credible health insurer identified was in fact the dominant insurer in the state (in terms of market share). However, the authors found that "life insurers" in all these states also sold health insurance to individuals. The largest life insurer had only 4 to-8% of the total premium revenue in most of these markets, but there were a few states in which the largest life insurer accounted for 10 to 16% of individual health insurance premiums.
Insurance Market Structure in 2010 and After
Starting with the 2010 filing year, the SHCE provides a unique opportunity to construct a complete picture of both the individual and the small group health insurance markets. Because the exhibit is filed by life, fraternal, and property/casualty insurers in addition to health insurers, it is now possible to construct counts of all insurance carriers selling comprehensive health insurance. The reported number of policies, covered lives, member months and premiums earned can be used to conduct a more complete market share analysis because it is now possible to include the market shares of the non-health insurers.
Similarly, given that information is now available on all market participants, one can construct measures of market structure (e.g. the Herfindahl index) by states. In addition, the fully-insured small and large group markets can be separately identified, and thus the SHCE presents the first opportunity to examine the small group market.
In this paper, we used the 2010-2012 SHCE to examine the numbers of insurers in the individual and small group markets by state, lines of business (health insurance or life insurance) 9 , and whether they are credible or not. In 2010 and 2011, credible firms were defined as those having at least 1,000 member years. Credible firms with fewer than 75,000 member years were considered "partially credible" by DHSS, while those with at least 75,000 member years were considered "fully credible". Starting in 2012, "credible experience" is defined in a cumulative manner. If an insurer has fewer than 75,000 member years in 2012 in a given state and segment (e.g. individual, small group), its MLR is calculated using data reported for both the 2011 and 2012 MLR reporting years (Department of Health and Human Services, December 1, 2010, MLR Interim Rule). Therefore, even though an insurer may be "non-credible" (fewer than 1,000 member years) for the 2012 reporting year alone, it is not necessarily exempt from MLR regulation if it has at least 1,000 combined member years for 2011 and 2012. For 2012, we thus define credible insurers as those with at least 1,000 member years combined for 2011 and 2012. Table 3 presents the numbers of credible and non-credible insurers in 2010 and 2012 by state in the individual market, distinguishing health and life insurers. Table 4 presents the breakdown of enrollment by credible versus non-credible and by health and life insurers in the state in 2010 and 2012.
Tables 5 and 6 repeat the same exercises for the small group market. Table 3 Credible life insurers were largely absent from the remaining states with only two credible health insurers in 2010 (two in KY, one in ME, and none in HI and VT). Table 4 shows that credible health insurers comprised 70% of the individual market in 2010, on average, followed by credible life insurers (26%) and non-credible life insurers (4%). Overall, non-credible health insurers had a negligible market share (average of 0.01%). These figures remained stable in 2012.
Relative to the individual market, the small group market had more credible health insurers in 12 substantially fewer credible and non-credible life insurers (on average four and five, respectively) ( Table   5 ). Credible health insurers comprised about 80% of the small group market by market share. Credible life insurers comprised the remaining fraction of the market (about 20%), leaving non-credible health and life insures with a negligible market share (Table 6 ).
In Table 7 , we describe entry and exit of insurers as well as transitions from credible to non- . We present a 4-category breakdown of HHI by state using the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines: <1,500 (unconcentrated); 1,500-2,499 (moderately concentrated); 2,500-4,999 (highly concentrated); 5,000 and above (highly concentrated). Fourteen states had an individual market HHI less than 2,500 in both years. Similarly, in the small group market, the number of states with HHI less than 2,500 remained stable (18 in 2010, and 20 in 2012 Overall, the small group market was less concentrated relative to the individual market. Average HHI across all states were 3,252 in 2010 and 3,353 in 2012.
IV. The Performance of Insurers in the Individual and Small Group Markets for Health Insurance
Many empirical studies have investigated factors -primarily market structure and regulationsthat explain variation in health insurance premiums. A smaller body of recent research has focused on estimating the size of insurers' loading fees and/or medical loss ratios. The ACA medical loss ratio regulations implemented in 2011 have created heightened awareness of the latter. Other measures of insurer performance less commonly examined include insurer administrative expenses and operating margins.
Evaluating Insurer Performance Prior to 2010
Abraham and Karaca-Mandic (2011) A concern with viewing MLR regulations as limiting insurer market power is that the MLR is only one component of the price-cost margin; the other component is the share of premiums spent on administrative costs. Therefore, insurers could respond to the MLR regulation by altering administrative costs in ways that leave the price-cost margin unchanged. For example, insurers could reduce their efforts to manage utilization, leading to lower administrative expenses, higher claims payments, and higher
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MLRs. While some reduction in utilization management may be desirable for improving access to efficient health care (e.g., through lower levels of denials or pre-approvals), this reduction could also lead to increased claims for low-value medical care. Karaca-Mandic, Abraham and Simon (2013) found no evidence that insurers' administrative expenses as a percentage of premiums are related to insurance market structure. Thus, their results are largely consistent with the suggestion that health insurance regulators can use MLRs to measure market power in the individual health insurance market, but with notable caveats relating to measurement issues, limited ability to capture product and firm heterogeneity that can influence differences in price-cost margins, and other potential unintended consequences of the regulation.
Most studies of the small group market focus on state regulations in the 1990s and their effect on premiums (Buchmueller and DiNardo, 2002; Marquis and Long, 2002; Schone, 2004, Davidoff, Blumberg, and Nichols, 2005; Simon, 2005) . Karaca-Mandic, Feldman, and Graven (2013) recently investigated the effects of competition in the market for insurance agents and brokers on premiums for small employers (50 or fewer employees). Using the Medical Expenditure Panel SurveyInsurance Component and data from the National Association of Health Underwriters, they found that premiums of policies offered by small employers are lower in markets with stronger competition among insurance agents and brokers.
A less examined performance measure is the health insurance loading fee (L) that represents the portion of a premium not related to medical care -largely administrative costs. The loading fee typically is modeled as a multiplier to expected claims:
For example, if premium is $125, and expected claims are $100, the loading fee is 0.25 or 25%. The loading fee is closely rated to the MLR. Prior to passage of federal health reform, the MLR was defined as the ratio of expected claims paid by the insurer to the premium. Expressing the loading fee as a multiplier of expected claims, the MLR can be written as:
In this framework, the loading fee captures an insurer's costs for general administration, underwriting, marketing, broker commissions, medical management and claims adjudication, as well as any profits or net income for a non-profit insurer.
The most commonly reported loading fee estimates by firm size date back more than two decades, when the Hay/ Huggins Company prepared an actuarial study for the U.S. Congress House Committee on Education and Labor in 1988. These estimates reflected the underwriting practices of major insurers and suggested loading fees of about 40% for the smallest firms (1-4 employees), 25% for those slightly larger (20-49 employees), and 18% for those with 50-99 employees. Hay/Huggins also reported that loading fees decline to 16% for employers with 100-499 employees and 12% for those with up to 2,500 employees. These estimates from the 1980s are still cited frequently in the literature, including current health economics and health insurance texts (Phelps, 2010) .
Using data from the confidential MEPS Household Component-Insurance Component Linked
File, Karaca-Mandic, Abraham, and Phelps (2011) recently generated new estimates of loading fees and how they differ across the firm size distribution. They found that firms of up to 100 employees face similar loading fees of approximately 34%. Loads decline with firm size and are estimated to be 15% for firms with between 101 and 10,000 employees and 4% for firms with more than 10,000 workers.
Insurer Performance in 2010 and After
Starting in the 2010 filing year, the SHCE includes line items for insurers to compute each component of the MLR as defined by the regulation. The SHCE also has a line item for the MLR. In comparison with the period before 2010, the ACA regulations made several changes to the historical definition of the MLR (the ratio of claims to premiums). First, the ACA classifies insurers' expenses for certain quality improvement activities as "clinical benefits" that can be counted similarly as medical claims. Certain activities for fraud and abuse detection and recovery can be included in the numerator of the MLR. Second, federal and state taxes, licensing and regulatory fees are deducted from premiums earned in the denominator.
Using data from the SHCE, several studies have examined insurer filings for reporting years of 2010 (considered as a pre-MLR regulation year) and 2011. The General Accounting Office (2011) analyzed insurers' MLRs in the individual and group markets. Using 2010 data and the new ACA standards described above, GAO found wide variation in MLRs in the individual market, with only 43% of credible insurers and 48% of covered lives at or above the 2011 standard. These percentages were notably higher for the small and large group markets. Hall and McCue (2012) , examining the NAIC's 2010 data, estimated that rebates paid to consumers would have reached almost $2 billion ($1 billion in the individual market, $0.5 billion in the small group, and $0.5 billion in the large group market) if the MLR regulation had been implemented in 2010.
However, it is important to note that measurement of MLR in the SHCE does not exactly match the MLR used by the HHS to determine rebates. In fact, the MLR reported in the SHCE is labeled as the "preliminary MLR." Several adjustments are needed to properly calculate MLR rebates. The first is a "credibility" adjustment to reflect that insurers with smaller enrollment face more variable claims and premiums, and thus should be given additional room to meet the MLR threshold. Under formulae published in the Interim Final Rule of the regulation, insurers with more than 1,000 but fewer than 75,000 member-years (known as partially-credible insurers) receive a credibility adjustment of up to 8.3% to their preliminary MLR on a sliding scale. Insurers with 75,000 or more member-years (fully credible) do not receive any credibility adjustment. Using the member-years reported in the SHCE, it is possible to calculate the credibility adjustment.
A second adjustment allows insurers that sell high deductible policies to increase the MLR. The rationale for this adjustment is that administrative cost is generally a disproportionately higher share of the premiums in high deductible policies because the deductible reduces claims costs and premiums but 18 not administrative costs. Because the SHCE does not include benefit design information, it is not possible to calculate this adjustment with only the SHCE data.
Third, HHS's rebate calculations allow claims paid through March of the following year to be included in the numerator of the MLR. Because the SHCE is for the reporting year only, it is not possible to make this adjustment. In a follow-up study, McCue, Hall and Liu (2013) distinguished between for-profit and non-profit insurers and found that reductions in administrative costs and operating margins were primarily driven by for-profit insurers in the individual market. Non-profit insurers already had high MLRs in 2010 relative to for-profit insurers (88.1% vs. 71.8%). In the small group market, the percentage of premiums spent on administrative costs declined more among for-profit firms (from 19.4% in 2010 to 18.7% among forprofits, from 12$ to 11.9% among non-profits). Surprisingly, however, operating margins (defined as the 11 http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_health_reform_solvency_impact_exposure_related_doc_shce_preliminary_ml r_cautionary_statement.pdf 12 Beginning in the 2013 reporting year, information from two years prior to the MLR reporting year will be used percentage of premiums not spent on clinical services or administrative costs) increased slightly from 1.6% to 2.8% among non-profits with no significant change among for-profits. Controlling for various factors -insurers' ownership type and HMO status, insurance market competition, and existing state laws -they expected to find heterogeneous responses by insurers' baseline characteristics. They found that several factors were significantly related to insurers' MLRs. Individual market insurers with more enrollments in other market segments have lower MLRs, on average, as do forprofit organizations (2.25 percentage points lower). In contrast, HMOs have MLRs that are 4.58 percentage points higher on average, which may reflect higher actuarial value plans. In the small group market, an insurer's overall enrollment across all states and segments is inversely related to its MLR, but the magnitude is small. Additionally, small group insurers that operate in more concentrated markets, We were able to conduct the aggregation exercise for the 2012 reporting year. We also made the credibility adjustment for the size of the insurer from member years reported in the SCHE. However, we could not adjust for benefit design or claims payments up to the first quarter of the following year. Median MLRs in 2012 are 83.55% and 83.7% in the individual and small group markets respectively. Table 9 reports summary statistics based on preliminary MLRs (with no adjustment), as well as
MLRs adjusted for aggregation and credibility for the partially credible insurers. The number of partially credible insurers in either the individual or the small group market is noticeably higher than the number fully credible insurers reported in Table 8 (preliminary) to 83.24% (aggregation adjustment) and to 85.58% (aggregation and credibility adjustments).
V. Other Measurement Issues
The SHCE was developed with the primary purpose of measuring relevant components of insurers' MLRs (claims, premiums, quality improvement, and expenses for detection of fraud and abuse)
as well as tracking their administrative expenses (e.g., claims adjudication, total general and administrative expenses including sales and brokers fees), and other financial aspects of the health insurers. Because the MLR regulation currently applies to individual and group markets only, the SCHE lacks information on other business segments represented in the State Pages (Medicare supplement, Dental, Vision, Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan, Title XVIII Medicare and Title XIX Medicaid).
Another limitation of the SHCE is that it lacks information on health services utilization encounters such as physician and non-physician ambulatory encounters and hospital inpatient days incurred, which is included in the Health State Pages. While one could use the SHCE together with the
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Health State Pages to obtain a more complete picture, life insurers and other non-health insurers selling health insurance still do not file the Health State Pages.
Finally, the figures reported in the SHCE do not allow for calculating exact rebates as discussed above. While it is possible to make credibility adjustments for partially credible insurers, neither the SHCE nor the State Pages includes information on the share of high-deductible plans or premiums. As another adjustment we did not discuss earlier, an insurer with 50% or more of earned premiums attributed to newly issued policies can be excluded from the MLR reports because they are likely to have lower claims. The SCHE and the State Pages do not include information on the share of newly issued policies.
As the ACA changes of 2014 begin to be implemented, it would of course be valuable for researchers to track consumers' and insurers' participation in health insurance exchanges. For example,
Federal household surveys could include questions on the scope of the insurance policy (e.g.
comprehensive or limited benefit), premiums and subsidies for the policy, as well as whether the policy was purchased in the exchange. Similarly, employer-based surveys such as MEPS-IC could incorporate additional questions to measure small employers' participation in SHOP exchanges (for example, whether they participated, the metal levels, and the premiums of the policies). NAIC could also request information that separates each insurer's business separately in and out of the exchange in each state both for the individual and small group markets.
VI. Conclusion
We provided a synthesis of the research available to measure and evaluate the size, structure and performance of the individual and small group markets. We discussed the availability and use of different data sets in measuring these concepts and we highlighted important measurement problems and possible solutions to consider when assessing the performance of health insurance markets as the ACA is fully implemented. Finally, we presented new estimates from 2012 using the NAIC SCHE filings.
Even after coverage hierarchies are imposed, Federal household surveys give widely different estimates of how many individuals were covered in the individual market prior to the ACA. While it is 24 premature to know precisely how the individual market will evolve given the introduction of Exchanges and additional regulatory structures created by ACA, we will presumably have better information on enrollment starting in 2014. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to track changes in enrollment and to conduct studies based on a pre/post-ACA design using the Federal household surveys because of the limitations in properly estimating the size of the individual market at the baseline. Unlike in the individual market, we have better estimates of the small group market enrollment from the MEPS-IC.
The NAIC was the only source available to identify insurers operating in the individual and group markets until 2011. However, the NAIC data were quite limited until 2010, when major improvements occurred through the introduction of the SHCE. This new exhibit filed by all insurers allows for estimating participation of non-health insurers (e.g., life insurers) in health insurance markets and provides a break-down of the group market into small and large groups. We used the NAIC data from 2010-2012 to estimate the share of life insurers as well as changes in market structure (counts of insurers and HHI) during this period.
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